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I am going to argue for a thesis that almost nobody in 
this audience would dispute: animals have things they 
care about, and the fact that animals care about them 
has moral significance. However, the lack of 
disagreement (in this forum, at least) should not disguise 
the fact that more wode needs to be done, both to answer 
a recent spate ofattempts to deny the thesis and to clarify 
exactly what "caring about" means, covers, and entails 
for our moral theories. 
It might be more natural to talk about animals' 
interests, rather than what they care about. Unfor-
tunately, this term has been interpreted in so many 
different ways that its use invites confusion. On one 
end of the spectrum, Tom Regan wants to allow for 
both preference and welfare interests, where the latter 
can involve things about which the subject knows or 
understands nothing.! On the other end, R.G. Frey 
associates "interests" with terms such as "wants" and 
"desires," and further argues that these states require 
a language.2 Rather than try to dictate which of these 
interpretations more nearly reflects ordinary English 
usage (a misguided prOject at best), I have chosen to 
use a term which I hope (a) has less "baggage," at 
least in the debate about animals, (b) will allow me to 
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specify what "caring about" means, and why it is 
important, and (c) in both ordinary usage and the 
broader philosophical tradition captures a distinction 
that is worth preserving. 
R.G. Frey is perhaps the most familiar defender of 
the position that animals cannot have desires. Although 
he does not use terms like "care about," his conclusion 
also entails that animals are incapable of caring about 
things in the sense to be defmed below. His argument 
can be summarized as follows: 
pol. In order for S to desire 0, S must have some 
beliefs about O. 
P-2. Beliefs require the ability to entertain and 
accept certain statements as true, and hence the 
ability to draw a distinction between true and 
false statements. 
P-3. The ability to draw a distinction between true 
and false statements requires the use of 
language, and some understanding of how 
language represents states of affairs. 
P-4. Animals lack the requisite linguistic abilities. 
C. Therefore, animals lack beliefs, desires, and 
interests.3 
Although this argument is most closely associated 
with Frey, it has been echoed by Michael Leahy.4 Both 
agree, for example, that Regan's broader use of 
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"interest" cannot be sufficient to establisb moral 
relevance, since Regan's concept of interests would, 
according to them, entails that tractors as well as can 
bave "interests" in that sense. 
Many animal scientists also reject talk of animals' 
interests or desires or caring, usually preferring terms 
sucb as "needs" wbicb seem to them more quantifiable 
and testable, bence more scientifically respectable. A 
full defense of my appeal to a concept of "caring about" 
sbould address the scientific claim; also Carruthers's 
arguments on this subject, and would explore some 
reasons wby Daniel Dennett's recent account of 
consciousness5 poses a very similar threat to talk. of 
animals' interests and caring. Althougb there will not 
be time to do justice to these themes today, they do 
indicate the range of serious cballenges to the idea that 
animals do have interests and care about things. 
As I have already acknowledged, terms like 
"interests" have a rather messy bistory, even within 
the narrow confines of debates about animals. Very 
roughly, with many intermediate possibilities left 
aside, the two opposing interpretations of "S bas an 
interest in 0'>6 would be: 
(1) "S [rationally?] desires 0," or 
(2) "0 would enhance S's ability to fulfill its proper 
function, role, or telos." 
Sense (1) is the one that leads Frey, Carruthers, 
and Leahy to reject the claim that animals can bave 
full-blown morally weighty interests. Again acknowl-
edging the oversimplification, it would seem that for 
all three, S's desiring 0 entails (a) that there is a way 
of specifying, fixing, or correctly identifying the 
object of S's desire, and (b) that S bas the capacity 
to identify 0 and distinguisb it from things that would 
not satisfy the desire. 
Tbe perbaps surprising link with Dennett comes 
primarily througb condition (a), with (b) providing a 
secondary connection. Althougb Deooett is generally 
considered a supporter of cognitive ethology and its 
references to the intentional mental states of animals,? 
his more recent championing of "beteropbenomonology" 
gives a special role to language in fIXing the appropriate 
ascription of intentional states.8 
A tempting, but probably misguided, response to 
this argument is to treat it as a variant on the problem 
of other minds: we can never get to the truth of what 
the cat wants, because tbe cat can't tell us in 
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unambiguous enougb terms.9 If we interpret the issue 
this way, we migbt be tempted to respond: "we can't 
tell, but the cat can, and that's wbat matters." This would 
beg the question: the cbarge is not simply that we cannot 
properly identify the object of the cat's desire, but that 
it cannot have any desires without a language in wbicb 
to express true and false propositions about that object. 
The cbarge is that the cat lacks a medium in wbicb to 
refer to or represent the object of any belief or desire, 
and bence cannot bave beliefs and desires. 
Contemporary pbilosopby provides a mucb more 
effective response to this concern about the possibility 
ofbaving an object ofbeliefor desire. to The two salient 
points for our purpose, in their most general form, are: 
(1) any adequate psycbological theory that bopes to 
explain animal bebavior will have to attribute to many 
animals the ability to receive, encode, recall, and use 
sucb information; 11 and (2) there is no reason to think 
that the medium in whicb the mindlbrain encodes and 
manipulates information is identical with the language 
(if any) in wbicb one communicates. Hence, the lack 
of a natural language of communication does not 
provide good evidence against the bypothesis that a 
being bas a language of tbougbt. And it is tbe 
language of thougbt or something analogous to it, 
not communication, tbat provides the basis for 
propositional attitudes. 
The first of these very general ideas drawn from 
contemporary pbilosopby of mind is an essential part 
of a more general demonstration of wby Bebaviorism 
simply won't work. Bebaviorism simply bas not been 
able to give an adequate theory wbicb explains the 
bebavior of (at least) birds and mammals simply in terms 
of stimulus response and positive and negative 
reinforcements; either because the salient features for 
explaining the feature may not be present in the 
environment at the time, or because the feature is not 
one wbicb can be captured in law-like statements about 
the environment.12 In marked contrast to the failures of 
Bebaviorism, theories that work inevitably postulate that 
complex creatures can carry with them and access 
internally stored information about the world. 
There are important disputes about the medium and 
mecbanisms required to store and use information: 
does it bave syntactic structure? bow holistic is it? etc. 
(Even, in Dennett's case: in wbat sense is it real?). The 
relevant point of agreement for our purposes is that the 
medium cannot be limited to natural languages such 
as Englisb. To do so (a) threatens to lead to an infinite 
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regress of interpretations of linguistic signs, (b) 
overlooks the fact that a very large portion of cognitive 
psychology works as well for animals that lack a natural 
language (small humans as well as nonhumans) as it 
does for adult language users, and (c) founders on the 
question of how we can learn a language without the 
prior ability to form hypotheses. Moreover, the inner 
representations in this medium, whatever it is, can be 
accurate or inaccurate, true or false, thus answering 
another of Frey's concerns. 
If the foregoing argument is correct, we have 
explained how a being can have beliefs and desires 
without having a language with which to communicate 
descriptions about the objects ofthose inner states. Thus, 
many animals can have beliefs and desires, and satisfy 
the conditions set forth for having interests in amorally 
relevant sense.13 Moreover, tractors don't have these 
sorts of inner states, and neither do paramecia. 14 
However, we are not out of the woods yet: although 
tractors and paramecia don't have desires (because they 
don't have mental representations), computers might 
well, and it would certainly disturb our reflective 
equilibrium to fmd our moral theory generating direct 
duties to our PC's. 
This is where "caring about" becomes relevant. At 
least none of the current crop ofartificial life cares about 
whether it gets what it wants.1S I wish to claim that we 
can identify a sense of "caring about" such that many 
animals typically do care about getting what they desire, 
but (at least the current generation of) computers do 
not. In order to justify that claim, we will have to unpack 
the notion of caring. 
I propose to do this via an indirect approach: by 
asking if/how we might be justified in saying that one 
animal is happier or more contented than another. If 
animal scientists read this paper, they will certainly 
either cringe or fume at the sloppy, untestable 
language, but that is exactly why I chose these terms. 
Despite their lack ofdirect physiological or behavioral 
correlates or indicators (or "operant definitions"), 
terms like "happy" and "content" do have a justifiable 
place in the scientific study of animals, and they also 
provide a clearer foundation for investigating what 
animals care about. 
The first thing any self-respecting animal scientist 
would do at this point is to ask what I mean by "happy," 
trying to raise the suspicion that there is no real state to 
be relied on here. The frrst thing any self-respecting 
philosopher would respond is that the demand for 
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necessary and sufficient conditions was well buried with 
logical positivism; although we sometimes can and 
ought to offer such conditions, they· are not always 
necessary for knowledge or respectable science. The 
undeniable fact is that experienced observers can tell 
quite well when an animal is happy. 
On the one hand, books about dog training, 
horseback riding, animal husbandry of all sorts, are 
filled with statements like: any good dog owner 
(dairyman, rider, etc.) can tell whether an animal is 
happy, fearful, bored, or irritated. On the other hand, at 
some point in almost any discussion of the treatment 
of fann or laboratory animal, someone inevitably raises 
the challenge: "But you can't really give us hard 
scientific data about how to tell whether an animal is 
happy, can you?" This challenge may be followed with 
the assertion that it is therefore wrong to demand that 
we act as if a severely confined animal is unhappy 
(since we don't know for sure that he is), or even the 
charge that one is committing the eighth deadly sin: 
anthropomorphism. 
The answer to this challenge lies in some fairly 
straightforward epistemology. On the assumption that 
we can set aside extreme skepticism (which would mean 
we would have to doubt not only the mental life but the 
physical existence of the sow and her crate, as well as 
the mental lives offellow humans), there are two widely 
recognized reliable indications that we know what we 
are talking about, and that we are describing something 
real about the world. 
The frrst way to convince you that I know what I'm 
talking about, that I'm saying something true, is to 
describe to you a general scientific theory and 
methodology that allows us to explain, predict, and 
understand in a fairly deep way, what is going on. If 
you ask me why stones roll downhill, and I glibly assure 
you that "it's because of gravity," you probably should 
probe to see whether I can back up my assertion in this 
sort of way. You might find out that I know no more 
about gravity than a nineteenth century biologist who 
blithely tells us that we move because of our elan vital. 
This, of course, is the ultimate aim of science. We want 
to know not only what happens, but why it happens. As 
a result ofa better understanding of why things happen, 
I often also get better at predicting and identifying what 
happens: as a result of understanding. In the case of 
happiness, this approach does not look very promising. 
However, we often do remarkably well even in the 
absence of such deep explanatory theories, and we do 
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so without lapsing into "subjectivity." All of us, to some 
extent, and some of us to an astounding extent, can 
recognize features of the world without being able to 
spell out in any detailed way how we do so. Here are 
some examples:16 
(1) Chicken sexers. 
(2) SAT evaluators and others who grade "stand-
ardized" essay exams. 
(3) Chess players who recognize significantpatterns. 
(4) Any competent English speaker judging the 
grammaticality of sentences. 
The objectivity in such cases is established in two 
ways. First, predictive success: the success rate of the 
chicken sexer can be determined quite easily, and good 
pattern recognizers will win more chess games. Second, 
where the observers are in fact picking out something 
that is really there, we find a high degree of inter-
subjective agreement, at least among skilled, trained, 
experienced practitioners. These two features provide 
good epistemic warrant for believing that observers are 
accurately detecting an objective feature of the world, 
something that is really "out there." Both features can 
often be found in judgments about an animal's 
emotional and mental states. 
Predictive success in judging an animal's inner 
states, including happiness, comes down to whether we 
can interact as we want to with animals: they do what 
we want, don't attack us, settle down calmly, thrive 
without developing "vices," and so on. That's why 
books on dog training and horseback riding are so filled 
with talk about the need to recognize when an animals 
is happy or contented. Learning to recognize these states 
increases one's success at working well with the animal. 
Intersubjective agreement (assuming objective, 
knowledgeable observers) is less obvious in the case 
of animal happiness because heavily influenced by 
preconceptions and the fact that we have been taught 
to talk about animals in more "rigorous" and "scientific" 
ways. However, if we focus on people who work and 
live with animals, the intersubjective agreement soon 
becomes apparent. Good dog handlers will usually agree 
about whether a dog is enjoying herself; two shepherds 
will pick out the same ewe as the one who is 
uncomfortable; and so on. 
Given that reports by observers with a high degree 
ofpredictive success and intersubjective agreement are 
perfectly respectable sources of objective knowledge 
claims, and given that we have such a situation with 
reports about whether animals are happy, content, upset, 
etc., I conclude that we are justified in accepting those 
reports as descriptions ofanimals' actual states. Having 
done so, we are ready to return to the topic ofcaring about. 
Having argued that we can talk about an animal's 
being happy or unhappy, and make reliable judgments 
about such states, I now propose to define what Scares 
about in terms of what makes Shappy (or less unhappy) 
in the following manner: 
S cares about 0 ifS directly desires 0,17 and getting 
or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness. 
This definition entails that getting (or being denied) 
what she cares about makes a difference to the general 
state of S's experienced well-being. It also allows for 
varying intensity of caring: some things will matter 
more than others. Finally, this definition entails that we 
can be mistaken about what we care about we can think 
we care about something, only to discover that we were 
wrong: when we achieve it, we discover that it does 
not make us happy. These features combine to delineate 
a real phenomenon in many humans and many animals. 
The resulting definition accords well with our ordinary 
concept of caring about, and helps explain why the 
objects ofcaring carry moral significance in a way that 
more neutral interests may not. 
Let me emphasize that I am not claiming that we 
care about things because they contribute to our 
happiness; we may sometimes do so, but we may have 
all sorts of other reasons for caring about something. 
Rather, I am suggesting that a hallmark, a definitive 
criterion of what we care about (as opposed to what we 
think we care about) is that it contributes to our 
happiness or alleviates our unhappiness. 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to 
offer a complete axiology and to locate "what we care 
about" in that framework. However, at the very least, 
the sort of interests highlighted in this new vocabulary 
of "caring about" carry more primafacie moral weight 
than things that are merely "good for" some being. If 
one is apreference utilitarian, for example, caring about 
is a more obvious manifestation of preference than 
interests in any weaker sense. From a deontological 
perspective, paying due attention to what a being cares 
about seems an appropriate way of respecting the 
individual as a source of valuing, without reducing him! 
her to a mere contributor to the general good. In any 
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event the values highlighted by what we care about will 
be hard to ignore in an adequate moral theory. 
In this paper, I have argued for two theses. The ftrst 
is that arguments such as Frey's and Leahy's fail to 
establish that animals do not have interests in a morally 
relevant sense. The second is that we can identify the 
relevant sense of interests, and at least begin to illustrate 
its moral relevance, by focusing on the question ofwhat 
animals care about. There is much more to be said on 
this topic, of course. The critical side of my argument 
must be extended to respond more specifically to other 
skeptics, such as Davidson and Carruthers, and potential 
skeptics such as Dennett. More work also remains to 
be done to establish the exact role in our moral theory 
of what beings care about. However, we have made 
signiftcant progress in both these directions. 
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